Abstract. This paper reviews recent developments in the density discontinuity approach. It is well known that agents having perfect control of the forcing variable will invalidate the popular Regression Discontinuity Designs (RDDs). To detect the manipulation of the forcing variable, McCrary (2008) developed a test based on the discontinuity in the density around the threshold. Recent papers have noted that the sorting patterns around the threshold are often either the researcher's object of interest or may relate to structural parameters such as tax elasticities through known functions. This, in turn, implies that the behavior of the distribution around the threshold is not only informative of the validity of a standard RDD; it can also be used to recover policy-relevant parameters and perform counterfactual exercises.
Introduction
Regression Discontinuity Designs (RDDs) are currently among the most popular research designs in applied economics research. This method exploits the discontinuous variation in the probability of treatment around a known cutoff to identify the local effect of the policy. A feature of this method that perhaps explains its popularity is that researchers need only to invoke mild continuity assumptions in conditional mean functions to identify the effects 1 Syracuse University, E-mail address:hbjales@maxwell.syr.edu 2 University of Tsukuba, E-mail address:yu.zhengfei.gn@u.tsukuba.ac.jp Date: September 24, 2016. of interest. Moreover, similar to randomized trials, tests of the identifying assumptions can be used to verify the validity of the approach in various settings.
Often, a policy is set as a discontinuous function of an endogenous variable. As a result, agents may alter their choices to ensure that they remain on the desired side of the cutoff. Empirically, the distribution of these variables tends to present a discontinuity at the cutoff. For example, piecewise linear income tax schedules result in discontinuities (and bunching) in the density of earnings (Saez, 2010; Kleven and Waseem, 2013; Kleven, Landais, Saez, and Schultz, 2014) . Firm size distributions exhibit similar behavior when companies are subject to discontinuous changes in tax liability at certain employment thresholds (Garicano, Lelarge, and Van Reenen, 2013) . Imperfectly enforced price controls, such as the minimum wage, generate a similar pattern in the wage distribution (Meyer and Wise, 1983; Doyle, 2007; Jales, 2015) . Hospitals' levels of spending present discontinuities when reimbursement schedules are non-linear functions of spending (Bajari, Hong, Park, and Town, 2011; Einav, Finkelstein, and Schrimpf, 2016) . The presence of a "pass/fail" threshold may generate discontinuities in grade distributions when teachers have some degree of discretion in grading (Diamond and Persson, 2016) .
The presence of discontinuities in the distribution around points at which individuals are subject to large changes in outcomes as a result of small changes in behavior suggests that these patterns may reveal important features of the agents' behavior. That is, discontinuities in distributions may be exploited for econometric identification. In a similar spirit to the RDDs, abnormal behavior in the distribution function around an otherwise continuous distribution is attributed to the discontinuous nature of a policy around a threshold. Importantly, contrary to the RDDs, outcome and forcing variables are usually the same object in these settings. This is a distinct feature of these problems; the researcher's object of interest is the change that the policy induces in the distribution of the forcing variable itself.
In this paper, we review the recent developments in methods that exploit the behavior of the density of the forcing variable at and around a threshold to uncover agents' response to the policy or to estimate structural parameters. We refer to these methods as the density discontinuity approach.
Although both RDDs and the density discontinuity approach make use of policies or rules involving discontinuous changes at a known threshold, they differ in identification conditions and strategies. The key identification condition in RDDs is the agents' inability to perfectly control the forcing variable (Lee, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010) . RDDs become invalid if the discontinuous rule induces the agents to (precisely) manipulate the forcing variable around the threshold.
1 In contrast, the density discontinuity approach is wellsuited to self selection or sorting in the forcing variable. The forcing variable upon which the discontinuous rule or policy is based is regarded as an endogenous outcome variable in the density discontinuity approach. In RDDs, the requirement of imperfect control of the forcing variable implies that the density function of the forcing variable is continuous at the threshold (McCrary, 2008) . Based on this, McCrary (2008) proposed the well-known manipulation test. 2 The rejection of the null hypothesis of continuity suggests the failure of RDDs. However, detecting a discontinuity in the density function at the threshold is precisely the start of the density discontinuity approach. 3 The density discontinuity approach exploits the relationship between sorting patterns around the threshold and changes in the density of the forcing variable to uncover the effects of the policy on the forcing variable. As we will show, it is often possible to relate the changes in the distribution of the forcing variable to structural parameters such as tax elasticities, employment effects, and other behavioral responses.
The density discontinuity approach also differs from a standard RDD in the following two respects. First, RDD relies on the assumption that the expectation of potential outcomes conditional on the forcing variable is continuous at the threshold (Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw, 2001 ; Lee and Lemieux, 2010) . In the density discontinuity approach, however, the outcome and forcing variables coincide and identification relies on a different type of smoothness condition: The variable of interest would have a continuous density function had the discontinuous policy not been implemented. Kleven and Waseem (2013) assumed that the density of earnings would be continuous under a baseline linear tax system. Doyle (2007) and Jales (2015) assumed that the wage density would be continuous in the absence of a minimum wage. Bajari, Hong, Park, and Town (2011) assumed that the density of health care expenditures would be continuous in the absence of discrete changes in the reimbursement rate. Second, in RDDs, the identified causal effect is expressed as the ratio of the jump in the conditional expectation of the outcome to the jump in the conditional probability of treatment at the threshold (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008) . However, in the density discontinuity approach, the relationship between the structural parameters and the density jump is usually more context-specific and model-dependent. Researchers typically establish models that describe the agent's behavior around the threshold and then recover the structural parameters from their relationship with the observed density jump. For 1 Urquiola and Verhoogen (2009) provide an example of such manipulation in the context of enrollment, class-size, and student outcomes. 2 Frandsen (2013) designed a test for manipulation when the forcing variable is discrete. Interestingly, the discontinuity at the density of the forcing variable can also be exploited to provide bounds for the parameters of interest in an RDD in the presence of manipulation of the forcing variable (Gerard, Rokkanen, and Rothe, 2015) . example, Doyle (2007) identified the probability of non-compliance with minimum wage policy as the ratio of the wage density just above the minimum wage to that just below the minimum wage. Other parameters such as the probability of workers receiving the minimum wage and the probability of disemployment are related to the density discontinuity in more complicated ways.
Although the density discontinuity approach is distinct from RDDs in conception and practice, interestingly, in some scenarios, the two approaches are connected via the sampling scheme. 4 In section 3, we investigate the connection between density-based identification and RDDs and discuss the conditions under which the objects identified from a discontinuity in the density can be related to the objects typically identified in RDDs. 5 We study a problem in which the density discontinuity approach can be used to identify the sign and test the significance of the effect of the policy in a context where RDD is infeasible given the limitations of the data. Inference in the density discontinuity approach typically involves estimation of the densities to the left and right of the threshold. This resembles the data binning approach of McCrary (2008) , which tests for the discontinuity in the density of the forcing variable at the cutoff. Although in the density discontinuity approach, the parameter of interest may take a more complicated form than a simple difference (or a logarithmic difference) in terms of densities near the cutoff, an important building block is also the bias-corrected estimation of the density at the boundary (the cutoff). A vast amount of statistical literature has studied density estimation with bias reduction at the boundary (Cline and Hart, 1991; Müller, 1991; Wand, Marron, and Ruppert, 1991; Cheng, 1994; Cheng, Fan, and Marron, 1997; Zhang and Karunamuni, 1998; Zhang, Karunamuni, and Jones, 1999) . Such work could be applied to inference in the density discontinuity approach. In this paper, we review three well-developed approaches to test for or estimate discontinuity in density functions: the pre-binning approach proposed by McCrary (2008) , the empirical likelihood approach developed by Otsu, Xu, and Matsushita (2013) , and the recently introduced method of Cattaneo, Jansson, and Ma (2015) , which employs a local polynomial smoothing of an empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF).
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 investigates identification in the density discontinuity approach. While identification strategies in the density discontinuity Lee and McCrary (2009) serves as such an example in studying how the juvenile criminal behavior responds to an increase in the punitiveness of sanctions at age of 18. They used panel data that recorded the birth date and the offense date for felony arrests in Florida from 1989 to 2002. In this setup, a discontinuity in the density of age conditional on offending at the age of 18 would suggest an effect of the policy. Instead, Lee and McCrary (2009) constructed the hazard rate of arrest at each age (in weeks). Then, they employed an RDD analysis to search for a discontinuous change in the hazard function at age of 18.
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approach are context-specific, we attempt to uncover the similarities among them and to provide a general framework. Section 3 discusses the relationship between the density discontinuity approach and RDDs. Section 4 discusses inference in density discontinuity by reviewing the main approaches to test for or estimate the jump in the density function at a known point. The final section concludes.
Identification: A Review of Selected Studies
This section describes the assumptions typically used to achieve identification in the density discontinuity approach. We will review papers covering the fields of health, public, and labor economics. We discuss the analysis of the elasticity of earnings with respect to taxes conducted by Kleven and Waseem (2013) , the response of hospitals to reimbursement structure as analyzed by Bajari, Hong, Park, and Town (2011) , and the effects of the minimum wage on wages and employment studied by Doyle (2007) and Jales (2015) . Despite the apparent dissimilarities across these topics, the identification arguments used in these papers are inherently connected. In all of these contexts, identification is achieved by a combination of (i) a smoothness condition, as is usually the case in RDD settings; (ii) limited spillovers, which essentially allows the researcher to use one of the sides of the threshold to uncover the underlying latent structure that would prevail in the absence of the policy; and (iii) an effect structure assumption, that is, a condition specifying the behavior of the individuals on the "affected" side of the threshold. In all of these applications, the density of the variable of interest will present anomalies around the threshold such as bunching at the threshold level or "missing mass" on one side of the cutoff.
6 The main differences among the papers we analyze concern, as we will see, how they model the behavior of the individuals on the affected side of the threshold. Variations of the effect structure assumption can be used to allow for intensive margin responses, as in Bajari, Hong, Park, and Town (2011) ; extensive margin responses, as in Doyle (2007) ; and response heterogeneity, as in Kleven and Waseem (2013) .
Kleven and Waseem
A fundamental question in public economics is the extent to which individuals adjust their earnings in response to the tax structure. Empirical investigation of this question is subject to standard concerns regarding endogeneity: Individuals who are subject to different tax structures may differ in their behavior due to a ceteris paribus behavioral response to the 6 To the best of our knowledge, the first paper to explore the concept of "missing mass" to achieve identification was Meyer and Wise (1983) . tax system, or because they differ in other ways that are unobserved to the econometrician. The tax system, however, commonly contains the so-called notches: discrete changes in tax liability that occur after marginal changes in earnings (Slemrod, 2013) . The discrete nature of the change in tax liability creates a dominated area, where the individual could increase both his consumption and his leisure by reducing his earnings until he locates himself on the "correct" side of the threshold. Moreover, the abrupt change in tax liability around the threshold suggests that analyzing the behavior around the threshold can shed light on the elasticity of earnings with respect to the tax structure.
2.1.1. An Economic Model. Individual preferences are given by
1+1/e , where z is before-tax earnings, T (z) is tax liability, and n is an ability parameter. If faced with a linear tax system T (z) = t · z, the solution to the individual's problem is given by z = n(1−t)
e . Thus, in this setup, e represents the elasticity of earnings with respect to the marginal net-of-tax rate. If n is drawn from a continuous distribution, then the distribution of earnings will also be continuous. Suppose that the tax system presents a notch at z * . 7 That is, assume that
, then some individuals who choose earnings just above z * under the linear tax system T (z) = t · z would be better off by bunching at z * .
This is the case because the potential marginal increase in utility given by the additional pre-tax earnings is more than compensated by the discrete decrease in post-tax earnings that occurs once one chooses earnings above z * . In the absence of optimization frictions or heterogeneity in tax elasticities in the population, a tax notch will lead to a gap, that is, an area of zero mass, in the density of earnings. Individuals who would choose z < z * under a strictly linear tax structure will still choose the same value of z under a system that presents a notch. That is, the model structure implies the absence of spillovers: The shape of the density of earnings for values below z * is preserved after the introduction of the notch. The introduction of the notch also generates intensive-margin responses. These changes, however, will be negligible if the changes in the marginal tax rates are small, that is, if ∆t is close to zero. Finally, there is a point z H sufficiently far from z * such that every individual who would choose earnings above z H would still choose the same level of earnings in the presence of the notch in the tax structure.
It is worthwhile to consider how these results change in the presence of optimization frictions or unobserved heterogeneity in tax elasticities. Conditional on e, all the model results are unchanged. However, the unconditional distribution will be different: For values of z just above z * all individuals will still react by bunching at z * , since the notch still introduces an area of strictly dominated choices for all values of e. As we move further away from z * , some individuals will bunch at z * (large e), whereas others will not (small e).
The presence of optimization frictions such as switching and attention costs, however, may prevent some individuals that could benefit from adjusting their behavior from bunching at z * . These types of frictions explain why the density of earnings may not be strictly equal to zero in the dominated area.
2.1.2. Statistical Model. Assume that the econometrician observes a random sample from the distribution of Z, that is, the distribution of earnings that prevails in the presence of the notched tax system. Our goal is to infer the distribution of Z (0), that is, the distribution that would prevail in the counterfactual state defined as the absence of the tax notch at z * . Based on the implications of the structural model, it seems reasonable to assume the following:
, that is, the individual does not react to the tax notch. 8 For all values of z > z H , π d (z) = 1, which means that
Under assumptions KW1 and KW2, there is a relationship between the observed density of earnings f 1 (z) and the latent density of earnings that would prevail in the absence of notches f 0 (z). The relationship is given by
where δ is the Dirac delta function. To achieve identification of the latent distribution, we need to specify a functional form condition on the latent distribution of earnings in the relevant interval. Define the relevant intervalĀ as any set such that [z * , z H ] ⊂Ā and that
Assumption KW3. In the relevant interval,Ā, f 0 (z), the latent density of earnings, is equal to m(z; β 0 ) for some β 0 ∈ R k . Figure 1 displays graphically the relationship between the latent density and the observed density, approximated by a rescaled histogram. The observed density will present a point mass at z * . Compared to the latent density, the observed density of earnings will present "missing mass" for values of z just above z * . For values of z below z * or sufficiently far above z * , the observed and the latent densities are equal. This follows from the assumption of no spillovers, the fact that the gains from bunching at z * are decreasing in the distance to z * , and the implicit assumption that there are no extensive-margin responses. That is, the notch does not induce any individual to exit (or enter) the labor force.
2.1.3. Identification. Under Assumptions KW1, KW2, and KW3, the latent distribution of earnings and the effects of the notch tax structure on the earnings distribution are identified. Identification of the latent density is trivial far from the notch point. For z < z * or
For the values of z in the interval [z * , z H ], the densities differ. In this range, identification rests on the equality f 0 (z) = m(z; β 0 ). For example, assume that f 0 (z) is a polynomial of order k of z. Given that the function m is known, f 0 (z) is identified as long as β 0 is. Identification of β 0 follows from the fact that
Intuitively, f 0 (z) is identified in the affected area [z * , z H ] by extrapolating the observed pattern of f (z) from the range where f (z) and f 0 (z) coincide. The identification argument uses a moment condition that can be exploited for estimation. 10 However, the left-hand side in this moment condition contains a density. Thus, the dependent variable has to be estimated before it can be regressed on z to estimate β 0 . This suggests a two-step procedure: Estimate the density of earnings, then choose β to minimize the distance between the estimated density and m(z; β). 11 Kleven and Waseem used a histogram in the first step, then estimated β 0 by a flexible polynomial of z excluding the affected range. The counterfactual latent density in the affected range was then estimated by the predicted values obtained using the parameters from the second step. This completes the identification of f 0 (z). The effects of the notch structure on the earnings distribution can directly be computed by comparing the observed density f (z) and the counterfactual density f 0 (z). The probability of non-response, the fraction of individuals at earnings z that are non-responsive to the notch, can then be identified from the relationship
As the latent density is essentially an unobserved object in the affected area, the local functional assumption may be violated. In this case, the object recovered by this identification and estimation method is not exactly the latent density; it is an approximation of the latent density. Using standard results from Taylor expansions, we can bound the approximation errors in the extrapolated range. For example, if the density is estimated using a linear function, then the two factors that determine the magnitude of the approximation error are the curvature of the latent density and the size of the affected interval.
The identification argument seems to imply that the researcher must know the level z H in advance. This, however, is not the case. Kleven and Waseem demonstrated that if the researcher begins with a guess of z H that is too small, the estimated missing mass of earnings will be smaller than the bunching observed at z H . This suggests a simple procedure, the convergence method: Begin with a guess of z H arbitrarily close to z * and progressively update your guess upward until the distance between the missing mass and the bunching mass is equal to zero. Kleven and Waseem (2013) used this method to estimate the latent density of earnings. Since features of the observed density such as the bunching mass and the level of z H are 10 Another way to identify β 0 is to exploit that the level and the derivatives of the density are identified at z * . This can be used to identify β 0 . Dong and Lewbel (2015) used a similar argument for the conditional expectation to identify the effect of changing the cutoff in RDDs. 11 In the data, however, individuals have the tendency to report round numbers such as multiples of 50 and 100. Kleven and Waseem address this particular form of measurement error by estimating the bunching probability by the excess of bunching that is observed above and beyond the bunching that one would expect from rounding alone. The expected bunching is estimated from the bunching observed at round numbers that are not at the tax notch.
related to the latent density implicitly through the tax elasticity parameter e, one can use these relationships to construct estimates of the elasticity e. Their results reveal that tax elasticities are small and optimization frictions are large. However, the response to the tax notch is still substantial. The coexistence of large responses and small elasticities is only possible because, around the tax notch, the change in tax liability is of first order. That is, the observed bunching behavior is large because the change that the tax notch induces in the budget sets is substantial. Meyer and Wise (1983) , in a parametric framework, explored the concept of "missing workers" in the wage distribution to estimate the disemployment effects of the minimum wage. Doyle (2007) showed that identification of the employment effects can be achieved without relying on a functional form assumption for the latent distribution of wages. Doyle replaced the parametric functional form with a mild smoothness condition on the distribution of latent wages and showed that the probability of non-compliance -that is, the probability that a worker who would earn a wage below the minimum wage in the absence of the minimum wage policy will continue to earn a wage smaller than the minimum wage after the policy is introduced -can be recovered by the discontinuity in the density of wages at the minimum wage level. A feature of this strategy is that the effects of the minimum wage on employment can be identified even when the minimum wage presents no variation in the data, that is, when all the workers in the population are subject to the same level of the policy.
Minimum Wage

Doyle's Model
Let worker i be characterized by an observed wage W i and a corresponding latent wage W i (0), which is defined as the wage that the worker would receive in the absence of the minimum wage. We will denote the minimum wage level by w * . Denote by F 0 (w) (f 0 (w)) the CDF (pdf) of latent wages. Similarly, denote by F (w) (f (w)) the CDF (pdf) of observed wages.
In the presence of the minimum wage policy, the worker will receive a draw W i from the distribution F (w), which we will refer to as the distribution of observed wages. Assume that the econometrician observes a random sample of observed wages {W i } of size N from a population of interest. That is, only wages in the presence of the minimum wage policy are observed. The goal of the exercise is to recover the distribution of W (0) from the information contained in the distribution of W . Let the following hold: Assumption D1. There are no spillovers from the minimum wage. This means that W = W (0) when W (0) > w * , where w * denotes the minimum wage.
Assumption D2. If W (0) < w * , then with probability π m , the worker receives the minimum wage (W = w * ). With probability π d , (W = W (0)), the worker's wage, is the same as the latent wage (non-compliance). With the complementary probability π u = 1 − π m − π d , the worker becomes non-employed (W = ·).
Assumption D3. The density of latent wages is continuous at w * . That is, lim w↓w * f 0 (w) = lim w↑w * f 0 (w).
Assumption D3 exploits the fact that the underlying distribution of productivity and bargaining power would likely be smooth, which in turn would imply that, in the absence of the minimum wage policy, the distribution of wages would be continuous. Assumption D1 excludes effects that are often thought to be important in minimum wage settings: general equilibrium effects and local spillovers.
12 However, this assumption can be relaxed by strengthening assumption D3 to a local functional form assumption such as KW3 in Kleven and Waseem (2013) . Assumption D2 parametrizes the effects of the minimum wage in the bottom part of the wage distribution. It states that, as the minimum wage is introduced, a fraction of workers earn the minimum wage; a fraction of workers will become non-employed; and another fraction of workers will not be affected by the policy. It is helpful to consider the constraints imposed in Assumption D2 since at first glance it may appear to simply be a characterization, that is, just a list of all possible cases. Assumption D2 requires that (i) wages do not cross the minimum wage level, that is, Pr{W > w * |W (0) < w * } = 0; (ii) the probabilities of non-compliance, earning the minimum wage and non-employment are not heterogeneous across workers with the same latent wage; (iii) the probabilities of non-compliance, earning the minimum wage, and nonemployment are not functions of the workers' latent wage; and (iv) workers who do not respond to the policy earn a wage exactly equal to their latent wage. Constraint (i) holds in simple microeconomic models of the labor market, such as the textbook neoclassical model. However, this constraint is violated in some search models and in models where workers of different skills are imperfect substitutes in the production function.
13 Constraint (ii) can be easily relaxed. When the minimum wage effect probabilities are heterogeneous in the population, the model will identify the natural extension of these parameters when they present heterogeneity in the population. That is, the model will identify the expected value of these (random) parameters in the population of affected workers. Constraint (iii) is at the heart of Doyle's identification strategy. By assuming that the probabilities of non-compliance are constant across latent wages, Doyle was able to infer the probability of non-compliance for all workers as long as he was able to recover the probability of non-compliance for workers who are close to the minimum wage level, which was done by exploiting the discontinuity in the observed density of wages at the minimum wage level. This assumption is clearly not innocuous since there are reasons to believe that workers who have latent wages close to the minimum wage level would be more likely to comply with the policy than workers whose wages are further away from it. Jales (2015) demonstrated that if one assumes that the probability of non-compliance is a small-order polynomial, such as a linear function of latent wages, then one can recover the slope of the non-compliance probability function by examining the discontinuity at the derivative of the wage density. Thus, although constraint (iii) is strong and plays an important role in the identification argument, one can relax it by strengthening the continuity assumption to hold for the derivatives of the latent wage density and exploiting the jumps in the derivative of the observed wage density to infer the changes in the non-compliance probabilities with respect to wages. Under Assumptions D1 and D2, there is a relationship between the latent density of wages f 0 (w) and the observed density of wages f (w). This relationship is given by
where δ is the Dirac delta function. The rescaling factor c ≡ 1−F 0 (w * )π u ensures that both the latent and the observed densities integrate to one in the presence of non-employment effects. Note that the presence of extensive margin responses (non-employment effects) causes the observed and latent distributions to differ not only below the minimum wage, but everywhere. Figure 2 graphically displays this relationship.
2.3.1. Identification. Consider the ratio of lateral limits of the observed density of wages around the minimum wage level:
An example of a model that is excluded by this assumption is that of Teulings (2000) . where the first equality follows from (2.2), and the second equality is obtained using assumption D3. Thus, the likelihood of non-compliance with the policy is identified by the discontinuity in the density of observed wages around w * . Consider now the behavior of the CDF of observed wages around the minimum wage level:
The left-hand side of this equation is clearly identified from data on observed wages. The right-hand side is a function of only one unknown, π m . This implies that π m is identified, which also implies that
To recover the latent density of wages, one needs to recover F 0 (w * ). This is the case because the relationship between the observed and latent densities can be inverted once we know the rescaling factor c. To see this, note that f 0 (w) =
One way to identify F 0 (w * ) is to exploit the fact that
This implies that the latent distribution of wages can be recovered under assumptions D1, D2, and D3. The discontinuity in the observed distribution around the minimum wage identifies the probability of non-compliance with the policy π d . The discontinuity in the CDF of observed wages around the minimum wage identifies the ratio (π d + π m )/π d . This, in turn, allows us to recover π u , c and, consequently, the entire latent wage distribution.
Employment effects identified by Doyle's method are related to the missing mass in the density of wages. That is, the employment effects are obtained by comparing the observed density of wages and the latent density that we can infer if non-compliance probabilities are constant and the latent density is continuous. It is easy to show that
. The first part of this expression is a measure of the missing mass of low-wage workers. It is the change in the proportion of workers who earn wages equal to or lower than the minimum wage level once the policy is introduced. The higher the value of this object is, the greater the number of workers who have "disappeared" from the wage distribution -over and above the mass accounted for by the bunching at w * -and, consequently, the greater the unemployment probability π u . There are key differences between the approach taken by Doyle to analyze the effects of the minimum wage and the approach taken by Kleven and Waseem to analyze the effects of tax notches. Doyle assumed the continuity of the latent distribution, whereas Kleven and Waseem assumed a local functional form. The latter condition is slightly more restrictive than the former. However, the practical differences between these conditions are likely of limited relevance. On the other hand, the local functional form assumption made by Kleven and Waseem allowed them to specify a non-response probability as an (unspecified) fully flexible function of z.
14 The same object, π d , is restricted to be a constant in Doyle's approach. Finally, the extensive margin response is a central question in estimating minimum wage effects, whereas this type of response is less important in the effects of the tax structure on earnings. As a result, Kleven and Waseem could exploit the fact that (1 − π d (z))f 0 (z)dz = Pr{Z = z * }. This essentially requires that all missing mass in the density to the right side of z * can be accounted for by the bunching at z * . This assumption is controversial in minimum wage settings since determining extensive margin responses -the employment effect -is a central part of the investigation. The presence of employment effects generates an excess of missing mass in the density that cannot be explained by the bunching at w * . Since densities are constrained to integrate to one, the employment effects induce a rescaling factor in the density. The rescaling factor makes the density of wages above the minimum wage greater than the latent density even under the assumption that wages above w * are unaffected by the policy. Doyle's model uses the concept of "missing mass" in the wage density to infer the employment effects of the minimum wage. In the next section, we discuss the extension to a dual economy in which the minimum wage is enforced only in the formal sector. Jales (2015) exploits the concept of an "excess of mass" to identify the probability of a worker moving from the formal to the informal sector: If many workers move from the formal to the informal sector as a result of the minimum wage policy, the cross-sectional distribution of wages will present missing mass for low wages in the formal sector and a corresponding excess of mass of low wages in the informal sector.
Jales' Model
Developing countries are often characterized by large informal sectors. That is, a substantial fraction of workers employed in the economy are not properly registered under the prevailing labor laws. Informal workers earn lower wages on average and do not have access to social security benefits such as severance payments. Naturally, they also do not pay labor taxes. Informality is thought to be associated with ineffective enforcement mechanisms and costly labor regulations such as labor taxes, job safety standards, overtime pay, and the minimum wage. Jales (2015) extended Doyle's model to a dual-economy setting in which workers can be employed in formal and informal sectors. This extension can be used to infer the role of the minimum wage in explaining the prevailing differences in the wage distribution and employment levels across sectors.
Let worker i be characterized by a pair of a wage (W i ) and sector (S i ), which is equal to one if the worker is employed in the formal sector and zero otherwise. Compliance with minimum wage legislation is enforced in the formal sector but not in the informal sector. This effectively means that the workers in the formal sector are not allowed to have wages below the minimum wage once the policy is introduced. If they remain employed in the presence of the policy, they must either move to an informal contract or comply with the policy by receiving a wage equal to w * . In addition, for each worker, define a pair (W i (0), S i (0)) that denotes the counterfactual -or latent -wage and sector in the absence of the minimum wage. 
d , the wage continues to be observed (W = W (0)), meaning that the worker successfully transitions from the formal sector to the informal sector.
15 In this case, the observed sector will be S = 0, being different from the latent sector. With probability π
m , the worker earns the minimum wage (W = w * , S = 1). With the complementary probability (π
m ), the worker becomes unemployed (W = ·, S = ·).
Assumption J3. The density of latent wages and its first derivative are continuous at w * .
That is, lim w↑w * f 0 (w) = lim w↓w * f 0 (w), and lim w↑w * f 0 (w) = lim w↓w * f 0 (w).
To complete the characterization of the latent economy, we need to define another object, Pr{S(0) = 1|W (0) = w}: Assumption J4. The conditional distribution of latent sector given the latent wage belongs to a parametric family {Λ(w, β) :
With the conditional probability of the latent sector (given the wage) and the marginal distribution of latent wages, we have completely specified the joint distribution of these variables.
16 The restrictive part of Assumption J4 is that the conditional probability of the latent sector given latent wages can be described by a parametric model. The first part of the above assumption states that there is a parameter β 0 for which the probability of the latent sector given the latent wage w is exactly equal to Λ(w, β 0 ).
15 The assumption that the wage remains exactly the same when the worker moves to the informal sector, that is (W = W (0)), substantially simplifies the exposition. The same results hold when this assumption is replaced with one in which the worker draws a new wage from f 0 (w|S(0) = 1, W (0) < w * ). This modification does not change the main results of the model. 16 This joint distribution is not explicitly written as the joint distribution that follows after workers maximize utility given heterogeneous wage draws, labor tax costs, and probability of fines for informal contracts, although this can be done. One can regard this latent joint distribution as the resulting joint distribution that would prevail after workers have made their choices given their draws.
Assumption J2 is a sector-specific version of assumption D2 imposed by Meyer and Wise (1983) and Doyle (2007) . This assumption imposes several restrictions on how the minimum wage affects the bottom part of the joint distribution of sector and wages. These restrictions are similar to the restrictions imposed by Doyle's model discussed in the previous section. In particular, the assumption implies that (i) π is not indexed by i, that is, the probabilities that characterize the effects of the minimum wage are the same for all workers; (ii) ∇ w π = 0, that is, the probabilities of non-compliance, unemployment, and earning the minimum wage are constants, as opposed to functions of workers' latent wage; and (iii) wages of sub-minimum-wage informal workers are not affected by the inflow of formal workers to that sector.
As discussed above, some of these restrictions simply ease the exposition, whereas others play a central role in the identification. Condition (i) is not central to the identification results. As in Doyle's model, if the probabilities are heterogeneous in the population, then we will identify the natural extension of these parameters in the presence of such heterogeneity. Condition (ii) plays a role in the identification. However, it can be relaxed if one is willing to impose smoothness conditions in the derivatives of the wage density. Condition (iii) is a standard "stable unit treatment value assumption" (Rubin, 1980 ) that rules out general equilibrium effects. Conditions (ii) and (iii) can be relaxed if one assumes that the latent wage distribution belongs to a known parametric family.
Under Assumptions J1, J2, and J4, there is a relationship between the observed and the latent wage distributions. The relationship is given by
where
u Λ(w; β 0 )f 0 (w)dw, and δ is the Dirac delta function. The unconditional probability of non-compliance will be a function of the latent wages even if the sector-specific parameters are not. This is the case because the unconditional probability of non-compliance is a weighted average of the sector-specific parameters weighted by the latent size of each sector for a given wage. As we move across different wages, the latent size of each sector will differ unless latent sector and wages are independent.
The sector-specific density of wages relates to their latent counterparts through the following relationships: 
f 0 (w|S(0) = 0)dw ensure that both densities integrate to one. These relationships are displayed in Figure 3 . The observed conditional probability of formality given the wage is given by Pr{S = 1|W = w} = 1I{w = w * }ψ + 1I{w > w * }Λ(w; β 0 ).
That is, the model has a strong prediction for the conditional probability of formality with respect to the wage: This object is equal to zero for wages below the minimum wage level. It is also equal to the latent probability for wages above the minimum wage level. At the minimum wage level, it is given by a constant ψ =
. The relationship between sector and wages in the presence of the minimum wage policy resembles the latent relationship between sector and wages for wages above w * . This implies that the parameters that govern the conditional probability of latent sector given wage can be identified from the relationship between observed sector and wage above w * . This result follows from the assumption of absence of spillovers and the implication of J2 that Pr{W > w * |W (0) < w * } = 0. This result, together with the functional form assumption for the conditional probability of latent sector given wage, allows us to extrapolate the relationship between sector and wages recovered from data on wages above w * towards the area where the latent relationship is unobserved in the presence of the policy.
17
17 Functional form assumptions such as J4 are convenient to uncover effects on joint distributions. Diamond and Persson (2016) use a similar assumption when studying the effects of teacher's discretion on grades. First, they recover the effects of such discretion on the distribution of grades themselves. Then, they 2.4.1. Identification. We will discuss identification for the special case in which assumption J4 is strengthened to Λ(w, β 0 ) = λ for all w.
18 Under this assumption, latent sector and wages are independent. Consider the ratio of lateral limits of the observed density of wages around the minimum wage level:
where the first equality follows from (2.3), and the second equality is obtained using assumption J3. Note that this is not sufficient to recover the sector-specific probability of non-compliance, since in the unconditional distribution, the non-compliance probability is given by π d = λπ
d . That is, the probability of non-compliance is a weighted average of the probability of non-compliance in each sector, weighted by the latent shares of each sector in the economy. Under independence between sector and wages, we can immediately identify π m and π u , and F 0 (w * ) since all assumptions of Doyle's model hold for the unconditional wage distribution. Moreover, it is possible to show that
where the last equality uses independence. Provided that F 0 (w * ) is identified, this equality demonstrates the identification of the sector-specific parameter π
m . Identification of the latent share of the formal sector follows from Pr{S(0) = 1} = Pr{S(0) = 1|W (0) > w * } = Pr{S = 1|W > w * }, where the first equality uses independence and the second equality uses the absence of spillovers.
19 Finally, the relationship between the identified aggregate parameters, the sector-specific parameters, and the latent shares of each sector can be used to solve for the remaining unknowns. 20 This completes the identification of the sector-specific parameters and the latent joint distribution of sector and wage.
specify a functional form assumption for the relationship between grades and outcomes such as wages and extrapolate the estimates of this conditional mean function into the area where manipulation occurs to learn about the effects of grade manipulation on these other outcomes.
18 See Jales (2015) for identification in the general case.
19 Note that limited spillovers can immediately be incorporated by changing the identification argument to Pr{S(0) = 1} = Pr{S(0) = 1|W (0) > km} = Pr{S = 1|W > km}, where k > 1 and km is the point above which spillovers are assumed to vanish.
20
The equations are given by:
and π
(1) Jales (2015) found statistically significant disemployment effects of the minimum wage in the U.S. and Brazil, respectively. Jales (2015) also found that the relative size of the informal sector in Brazil grows substantially, from approximately 20% to 27% of the economy. This result is driven by disemployment effects in the formal sector and the movement of workers from the formal to the informal sector that occur as a response to the policy (π (1) d ≈ 10%). Overall, labor tax revenues decrease, as the employment effects and the movement of workers to the informal sector are large enough to dominate the increase in wages that the minimum wage induces in the formal sector.
Doyle (2007) and
Bajari, Hong, Park, and Town
The medical industry faces important informational constraints. Hospitals are often more informed than health insurers about the optimal spending levels for each patient. The asymmetry of information between the hospital and the insurer generates agency problems: Hospitals may under-or over-provide medical care to different patients as a response to the reimbursement schemes offered by the insurer. Reimbursement schemes often have non-linearities such as "donut holes" -areas where the marginal reimbursement is zero. If hospitals react to reimbursement, then it seems plausible that they would choose their spending to locate themselves on the "right" side of the threshold, that is, the area where marginal reimbursement is larger. This suggests that the density of spending should be informative of the behavior of the hospitals. Bajari, Hong, Park, and Town (2011) developed a model and showed how to exploit the discontinuities in the density of spending to identify the parameters of interest. This section describes a simplified version of their model. 21 2.5.1. Model. Consider a health insurer (principal) and a hospital (agent). The health insurer offers the principal a reimbursement scheme based on the agent's spending (q). The hospital observes the degree of severity in the patient's health shock (θ ≥ 0) and then chooses a level of spending. Assume that the reimbursement scheme is given by
This is a fairly common reimbursement scheme. In this setup, there is a level of spending q * at which the marginal reimbursement changes discontinuously.
Assume that hospitals maximize an indirect utility function given by U (q, θ) = v(q, θ) − c(q) + αr(q), where c(q) is the hospital's cost function and v(q, θ) represents the patient's indirect utility. It seems reasonable to assume that the patient's utility is decreasing in the severity of the disease and increasing (and concave) in the hospital's care. To simplify the exposition, assume that v(q, θ) = − 1 2 q 2 θ −1 + kq − k 2 θ. This specification implies that the hospital's decision takes into account the marginal benefits of increasing care on the patient's health and the marginal costs of providing care. Moreover, to simplify the discussion, assume that the hospital faces a constant cost of providing care, and thus, we have that c(q) = c 0 .
23 Under a generic linear reimbursement scheme given by δq the optimal level of care provided by the hospital is given by θ(k + αδ). Note that α is proportional to the responsiveness of hospitals' spending with respect to changes in the reimbursement scheme. Thus, when α = 0 we have the case where the reimbursement does not enter the hospital utility function, which implies that the hospital spending does not depend on the reimbursement rate. The optimal level of care provided by the hospital under the non-linear reimbursement scheme is given by q(θ) = 1I{θ < θ * }θk + 1I{θ > θ * }θ(k + αδ 1 ), where θ * is a threshold of θ that determines the region of care where the hospital will choose to locate. The hospital is indifferent between locating itself in the lower reimbursement regions by spending q(θ * ) = θ * k or locating itself in the higher reimbursement region by spending q(θ
. If the distribution of health shocks is continuous, then the density of q will be continuous. The density of q will be given by
where h(θ) is the density of health shocks, q L ≡ θ * k and q H ≡ θ * (k + αδ 1 ).
Let Q(0) be the level of spending chosen by the hospital under a flat reimbursement scheme, such as r(q) = δ 0 . Let Q be the level of spending chosen by the hospital under the observed, non-linear reimbursement scheme. The non-linear reimbursement scheme induces a gap in the density, an interval (q L , q H ) of dominated choices where no optimizing hospital would decide to locate. Moreover, this model has another important feature: All outcomes are affected for Q(0) > q * . 24 That is, Pr{Q = Q(0)|Q(0) > q * } = 0. 25 This contrasts with 23 It is straightforward to generalize the model to allow the cost of care to be a function of the level of spending. This generalization does not change the main results of the model. 24 In practice, some hospitals may face large costs of adjusting their spending levels. In this case, the density of spending may not present a gap around q * . Thus, there will be "missing mass" in the dominated area, and the identification arguments need to be adapted accordingly. For the benefit of clarity in the exposition, we will retain the (perhaps oversimplified) model, which abstracts from measurement error or optimization frictions. 25 Note that in the models previously discussed, there was a fraction of individuals on both sides of the threshold that did not react to the policy. This fraction is equal to one on one side of the threshold if the model possesses no spillovers, and it is typically smaller than one on the affected side of the threshold. In Bajari, Hong, Park, and Town (2011) , this fraction was zero on the affected side of the threshold, that is, no level of observed spending Q was equal to the counterfactual spending Q(0) for Q(0) > q * . There is a θ * , a value of θ, at which the hospital is indifferent between locating on the two sides of q * . The marginal benefit of spending is increasing in θ. Thus, the hospital chooses q > q * for all θ > θ * , q < q * otherwise. Since the optimal level of care is a function of the marginal benefit of spending, the hospital is more responsive to changes in θ on the right-hand side of θ than on the left-hand side of θ * . The relationship between the latent density of spending Q(0) and the density that is observed under the non-linear reimbursement scheme is shown in Figure 4 . Contrary to the papers we have reviewed thus far, the density above q * is not larger because individuals have moved to the other side of the threshold (bunching effect) or because they have disappeared from the distribution as a result of non-employment effects (extensive margin effect). The mechanism that generates the abnormal behavior of the density here is more subtle. Hospitals are more responsive to a patient's condition above q * than they are below q * . This causes marginal differences in θ, the patient's level of sickness, to generate larger differences in the level of hospital care if θ is such that the level of care selected by the hospital is above q * . As a result, there will be a greater difference in the level of spending across individuals above q * compared to the level we observe below q * , that is, a larger sparsity in the distribution of spending. The intensive-margin response generated by the reimbursement scheme makes the hospital more responsive in terms of spending. If the density of θ is approximately flat in this area, this would lead to a decrease in the density of q above q * .
The discontinuity in the marginal benefit of spending generates a gap in the density around q * . Taking the ratio of q H to q L , we have that q H /q L = (k+αδ 1 ) k
. Thus, the magnitude of the gap in the density is proportional to the percentage change in the level, the intercept, of the marginal benefit curve (as a function of q).
26 If the marginal benefit of care in the patient's health is large (high k), the gap will be small. At the other extreme, if the marginal benefit of care on the patient's health is small (low k), then the change in marginal benefit of spending around q * can be substantial, which will lead to a larger gap. 27 2.5.2. Identification. This discussion suggests that the gap in the density around q * can be informative of hospitals' behavior. This intuition is correct. Assume that the econometrician observes a random sample of Q, that is, the econometrician observes the hospitals' behavior under the non-linear reimbursement scheme. The levels of q L and q H are identified directly from the observed distribution. Taking the ratio of q H to q L identifies the change in the level of a hospital's marginal utility function at q * .
Under the model's structure, the latent density of f 0 can, in fact, be fully recovered from the data. For q > q * , there are two differences in the density of Q relative to the density Q(0). First, the rescaling factor is different. It is smaller for q > q * because the hospital is more responsive to changes in θ for θ > θ * . Furthermore, the argument of h(.) changes from θ/(k) to θ/(k + αδ 1 ). This is because, as the function that relates θ to q(θ) has a larger slope for θ > θ * , the same value of q is a higher quantile of the distribution of q(θ) when q(θ) is given by θk than when q(θ) is given by θ(k + αδ 1 ). To recover the density of Q(0) for q > q * , we must be able to infer which value of q would be chosen by the hospital in the counterfactual flat reimbursement scheme. Identification of this object is facilitated by the fact that the gap in the density identifies the change in the intercept of the marginal utility of care. This factor is exactly the change in the argument of h(.) that occurs when the hospital faces a different incentive. Denote by F 0 (q) and f 0 (q) the respective CDF and density of Q(0) that would prevail under the flat reimbursement scheme. For q < q L , f 0 (q) = f (q); thus, the latent density is trivially 26 This result does not rely on assuming that the density of spending is flat around q * . This result is also robust to incorporating a non-trivial marginal cost of providing care. 27 Here, we implicitly assume that the hospital places a weight equal to one on the patient's utility. Generalizing the model to allow for a different weight leads to the following result: When hospitals place a large (small) weight on the patient's utility, the gap will be small (large). See Bajari, Hong, Park, and Town (2011) for details.
. Thus, by rescaling the observed density by a factor equal to the magnitude of the gap around q * and evaluating the observed density at a point different from q identifies the value of the latent density f 0 at q. This can be seen by writing the observed density as a function of the latent density:
.
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When α = 0, we have that lim q↓q H f (q) = lim q↑q L f (q) and q H = q L = q * . These relationships suggest precisely the tests for the null hypothesis of no response of hospitals to the reimbursement scheme used in Bajari, Hong, Park, and Town (2011) . The presence of intensive-margin responses causes the argument by which the density is evaluated to change between the latent and observed distributions. Thus, it is more convenient in this case to work with the quantile function. Note that, in terms of the CDF
Thus, we obtain
. The response of a hospital's spending to the reimbursement structure will reveal itself in the distribution of observed spending by a discontinuity in the level and derivatives of the quantile function. It is clear that rescaling the quantiles of the observed levels of spending Q by the factor k/(k + αδ 1 ) = q L /q H for the values of τ > τ * recovers the original quantile function of the latent levels of spending Q(0). From the quantile function, one can easily recover the corresponding CDF and the density. Thus, the latent density of hospital spending that would prevail under a flat reimbursement scheme can be inferred from the density observed under the non-linear reimbursement scheme. Bajari, Hong, Park, and Town (2011) estimated the magnitude of the density gap 28 This result is valid under the assumption the hospital's marginal utility of care under a linear reimbursement scheme is linear in q, given θ. Thus, the observed change in the hospital's marginal utility identified at q * can be used to determine the change in the hospital's marginal benefit for values of θ > θ * (or q > q * ). Given the results on flexible functional forms for the response probabilities under Doyle's and Jales' models, it seems that this assumption can be relaxed if one is willing to rely on derivatives of the density. and the discontinuity of the density of spending around q * . 29 Note that, despite the apparent dissimilarity, their model can be nested in our framework by modifying the effect structure assumption. That is, the statistical model that relates the latent density and the observed density is given by the following:
/k with probability one.
Assumption B3. The density of latent hospital spending
The unknown object in the effect structure assumption is not a probability as in the models we discussed thus far. Instead, it is the magnitude of the change in the hospital's spending, given by (k + αδ 1 )/k, and the values of the boundaries {q L , q H }. Thus, the density discontinuity approach can be used to estimate the magnitude of intensive-margin responses. The structure imposed by the functional form assumptions for the patient and the hospital's indirect utility imply that the change in a hospital's behavior is constant, equal to the factor (k + αδ 1 )/k for all hospitals, and independent of the value of Q(0), as long as Q(0) > q L . This restriction can be relaxed, for example, by assuming a linear function that relates Q(0) to Q for values of Q(0) > q L . In this case, the discontinuity in the level of the quantile function identifies the gap, the change in the height of the function that maps θ to q(θ), and the discontinuity in the derivative of the quantile function identifies the change in the slope of the function that maps θ to q(θ).
Bajari, Hong, Park, and Town (2011) estimated the magnitude of the gap and the discontinuity in the quantile function around the cutoff for the case of organ transplants. Their results suggest that hospitals are indeed more responsive to a patient's health shocks when faced with a larger marginal reimbursement schedule.
RDD and the Density Discontinuity Approach
Thus far, we have argued that the behavior of the density of the forcing variable around the threshold can be useful in identifying the agents' response to certain policies. This approach has some similarities with the standard RDD. It is clear that in both approaches, 29 Given the strong linearity of marginal utility assumption needed to recover the entire counterfactual density of spending and the fact that under measurement error or optimization frictions the density of observed spending may not present a gap at q * , Bajari, Hong, Park, and Town (2011) focused on identifying the changes in spending that would occur under a marginal change in the threshold q * . Their parameter of interest is similar to the object studied by Dong and Lewbel (2015) in the context of RDDs, the marginal threshold treatment effect.
identification is achieved from continuity assumptions: In RDDs, identification follows from an assumption of continuity in the conditional expectation of potential outcomes, whereas in the density discontinuity approach, the identification follows from an assumption of continuity of the latent density.
However, in contrast with the RDD, the parameters identified in the density discontinuity approach are typically model dependent. Furthermore, substantive knowledge regarding the sorting mechanisms must be embedded in the effect structure and spillover assumptions, whereas no such requirement is present in RDDs. In certain contexts, as noted by Einav, Finkelstein, and Schrimpf (2016) , different models may be consistent with the bunching behavior of the data but imply considerably different structural parameters. Their findings illustrated the importance of model choices in translating the observed data pattern into economic objects for counterfactual analysis.
30 These findings suggest caution before attributing to density-based identification the same credibility given to regression discontinuity-type identification. Thus, it is worthwhile to investigate whether there exists a scenario in which a discontinuity in the density would identify similar objects under the same assumptions as in an RDD. In other words, we ask whether there is a context in which a density-based identification would achieve the same degree of credibility as an RDD applied to the same problem. As we show below, the answer to this question is yes. In particular settings, the discontinuity in the density of the forcing variable conditional on the outcome identifies (up to a scaling factor) the same object, the local average treatment effect, as does the discontinuity in the conditional mean function in a standard RDD. We also argue that in certain contexts, only the former of these objects -that is, the discontinuity in the density -is estimable given the constraints in the sample.
For concreteness, we convey the main ideas with the following example. Suppose that the researcher is interested in the effects of a policy that restricts alcohol consumption. In particular, the goal is to recover the effects of the policy that prohibits individuals under the age of 21 from purchasing liquor. Let X be the age of the individual. Assume that each individual is constrained by the policy (denoted by D = 1) if and only if X < x * = 21, that is, D = 1I{X < x * }. Following the standard potential outcome notations, let Y (1) indicate whether an individual would consume alcohol when he is constrained by the policy, and Y (0) indicate whether an individual would consume alcohol when he is not constrained by 30 Kleven (2016) noted that the assumptions needed to identify the latent distribution and, thereby, the effects of the policy on the observed distribution of the forcing variable are typically weaker than those needed to identify the behavioral or structural elasticities associated with an agent's behavior. Moreover, Kleven (2016) argues that this problem is not unique to the density discontinuity approach. It is, in fact, ubiquitous to the problem of relating reduced-form parameters to structural parameters. Assumption 2. The density of X, f (x), is positive and continuous at x * .
If the researcher observes a random sample of (Y, X), then this is a typical sharp RDD context. Therefore, the local average treatment effect is identified by the discontinuity of the observed conditional mean Pr{Y = 1|X = x} at x = x * .
However, suppose that sampling scheme is different. Instead of observing a random sample of the pair (Y, X), the researcher only observes a random sample of the universe of individuals who drink alcohol. For each individual who drinks, the researcher observes his age. That is, the researcher has access to a random sample, representative of the population, of the distribution of X |Y =1 , whose density is given by
Observing the density of X |Y =1 presents difficulties for identification. The standard approach in RDD would be to construct estimates of the conditional mean function on each side of the threshold and compare the differences at the limit. However, observing only a random sample of X |Y =1 , one cannot estimate the conditional mean function of Y |X since Y is trivially equal to one for all individuals in the data. In this setup, identification must come from the information contained in the density of X given Y = 1.
Fortunately, one can connect the differences in the limits of the conditional mean function to differences in the conditional density of X given the outcome. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the density of X |Y =1 will be discontinuous at x * as long as the conditional mean function of Y |X is discontinuous:
, researcher observes the density of X |Y =1 , the density of the running variable conditional on the outcome. This is sufficient to test the significance of the policy and identify the sign of the effect. To obtain the magnitude of the local average treatment effect, the researcher must know or have access to external estimates of f (x * )/E [Y ] . Furthermore, for the treatment effect ratio, we have that
, and thus, the rescaling factors cancel out and the treatment effect ratio is identified.
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Thus, if the researcher observes a random sample of X with sampling weights given by Pr{Y = 1|X}, a setup that will naturally emerge depending on how the data are collected, he can use the discontinuity in the density he observes to learn something about the effects of the policy. The discontinuity in the density will identify the limit of the ratio of the expected value of Y (1) to the expected value of Y (0) to the left of the threshold. This ratio equals the proportional change in the expected value of the outcome induced by the policy. This can be used to infer the presence and sign of the treatment effect. The local average treatment effect, however, can only be recovered if the researcher knows Pr{Y = 1} and the density of X at x * .
RDD and the density discontinuity approach are also connected through their assumptions. These methods share the assumption of continuity of the density of the forcing variable. Moreover, the assumption of no spillovers used in the density discontinuity approach is implied by the observation equation (3.1) and the treatment assignment rule in the standard RDD. That is, in the RDD framework, equation (3.1) evaluated at X ≥ x * implies Y = Y (0), which is the equality labeled as "no-spillovers" in the density discontinuity approach.
33 Furthermore, embedding the RDD framework with the assumption that Pr{Y (1) = 1|Y (0) = 0, X = x * } = 0, the treatment effect ratio in (3.2) equals Pr{Y (1) = 1|Y (0) = 1, X = x * }. 34 Thus, the discontinuity in the density of X conditional on Y = 1 identifies the proportion of individuals at x * who do not respond to the introduction of the policy. This parameter has a similar interpretation to the probabilities identified in Jales (2015), Doyle (2007) , and Kleven and Waseem (2013) . The assumption 32 An alternative way to express this relationship is by writing Equation 3.2 in terms of a log-difference:
, so the left-hand side of this equation becomes the estimand of the McCrary test. 33 Note that the observation equation implicitly implies the "stable unit treatment value assumption" of Rubin (1980) . 34 Pr{Y (1) = 1|Y (0) = 0, X = x * } = 0 is implied by this stronger assumption: Y (1) ≤ Y (0). This assumption rules out individuals that would drink if they were under a policy that prohibits them from doing so but would not drink if they were not under such a restriction. needed in the RDD framework to equalize the treatment effect ratio to the probability of non-response to the policy can be thought of as the RDD analogous of the effect structure assumption used in the density discontinuity approach.
In summary, in a sharp RDD with a binary outcome augmented with a continuity assumption on the density of the forcing variable, one can identify features of the treatment effect, such as the treatment effect ratio, from the discontinuity in the density of the forcing variable conditional on the outcome. This can be used to infer the size, test the null hypothesis of no treatment effect, and -with the aid of assumptions regarding the effect structure -recover other meaningful objects such as the probability of non-response to the policy.
Inference on the Discontinuity in the Density
Section 2 shows that agents' responses and economic parameters can be identified as functions of the density to the left and right of a threshold, which is a potential discontinuity point. Denoting the threshold c, the main task of inference in the density discontinuity approach is to effectively estimate the densities
To focus on the essence and to be in line with the manipulation test in RDDs, we suppose that the researcher is interested in whether the density function f (x) has a discontinuity at x = c or is interested in measuring the jump size at the threshold c. In these scenarios, the parameter of interest is θ = f + (c) − f − (c). To be specific, in the density discontinuity testing problem, the null and alternative hypotheses are
The inference approaches discussed in this section are readily adaptable to scenarios in which the parameters of interest take other functional forms of density limits at the discontinuity point or densities at the boundary. For example, Doyle (2007) estimated the probability of non-compliance with the minimum wage policy from f + (c)/f − (c), the ratio of density limits at the discontinuity. Bajari, Hong, Park, and Town (2011) recovered the responsiveness of health care supply to changes in reimbursements using 1/f
where q H and q L are boundary points.
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The two points q H and q L satisfy f
* be the point where the reimbursement rate changes discontinuously and the researcher observes a random sample of {q i } n i=1 . Bajari, Hong, Park, and Town (2011) estimated q L and q H byq L = min{q i : q i > q * } andq H = max{q i : q i ≤ q * }, and showed that n(q L ) and n(q H ) converge to two independent exponential random variables.
In this section, we discuss three main approaches available in the econometric literature for testing or estimating the discontinuity at a given point in the density function: the data binning approach of McCrary (2008) , the empirical likelihood approach developed by Otsu, Xu, and Matsushita (2013) , and the method recently introduced by Cattaneo, Jansson, and Ma (2015) , which implemented a local polynomial smoothing of an empirical CDF. Throughout this section, we assume that the underlying density function f (x) has bounded left and right derivatives up to the order p + 1 at point c and has bounded derivatives up to the order p+1 everywhere else, where p is the order of the local polynomial used by the researcher. Moreover, we assume that the researcher observes an i.i.d sample {X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n }.
While the inference procedure resembles the manipulation test in the RDD literature, a subtle deviation demands care in certain contexts. The expressions (2.2) and (2.3) in the preceding section imply that the distribution of the variable of interest exhibits a point mass at the threshold c, which makes f (c) infinite. However, when we utilize the density discontinuity to identify parameters, the important objects are f + (c) and f − (c), irrespective of whether f (c) is finite. In the estimation, by excluding the data points at c, the point mass will not contaminate the inference procedure. Estimating Pr{X = c} itself can be performed using the sample analog
The discontinuity test or estimator involves nonparametrically estimating the density just to the left and to the right of the potential discontinuity point, where the boundary problem arises in terms of considerably larger estimation bias than the interior points 36 (continuous points in the current setting). It is well known that local linear regression automatically reduces boundary bias. 37 Therefore, it is reasonable to adapt the local polynomial fitting to density estimation. However, in the density context, the regressand and the regressor are not obvious. Hence, the first step is to create the regressand and regressor. The local linear (or polynomial) regression is implemented in the second step.
McCrary (2008) created the regressand and regressor based on data binning. The centers of the bin were treated as the regressor, and the normalized bin counts were viewed as the regressand.
38 Let {Z j } J j=1 be an equi-spaced grid of width b covering the support of X i .
36
The standard kernel estimator is generally not consistent at the boundary. Although rescaling the kernel estimator by a multiplier will restore consistency, the bias is still of order h (h is the bandwidth), which is larger than the bias of the density estimator at the interior points (of order h 2 ), (Jones, 1993) .
37
Let p be the order of the polynomial. If p is odd, the local polynomial estimator of the conditional mean has bias of the same order at the boundary as in the interior. (Both are O P (h p+1 ), where h is the bandwidth.) If p is even, the bias at the boundary is still of order h p+1 while the bias in the interior reduces to order h p+2 ; see Fan and Gijbels (1996) for details.
38
Local linear density estimator based on data binning was introduced in Cheng (1994) to account for the boundary effect; see also Cheng (1997) and Cheng, Fan, and Marron (1997) , among others.
of order h p+1 (Theorem 1 of Cheng, Fan, and Marron (1997) 
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). McCrary (2008) used the triangular kernel function K(u) = (1 − |u|)1I{|u| ≤ 1} in the local linear smoothing (4.2). Cheng, Fan, and Marron (1997) The basic idea of Cheng (1994) and McCrary (2008) was to employ the local linear regression to a "rough" estimation of the density: the normalized bin counts. When the bin size b goes to zero, the normalized bin counts defined in (4.1) become the empirical density function
where δ is the Dirac delta function. Jones (1993) discussed an approach that applies local linear fitting to the empirical density function (4.3). He further noted that this approach yields the same estimator of f + (c) and f − (c) as the kernel density estimator using some particular boundary kernels. 41 Doyle (2007) applied this equivalent boundary kernel method to Current Population Survey (CPS) data. Recently, Cattaneo, Jansson, and Ma (2015) employed a different strategy in the construction of a local polynomial estimator of the density at the boundary. The basic idea is to apply local polynomial fitting to the empirical CDF instead of the normalized bin counts (or the empirical density). In the first step, they constructed the (leave-one-out) empirical CDF evaluated at X i as the regressand and treated the original data X i as the regressor. In particular, to estimate f − (c), they generated the regressand as
where n 0 = n i=1 1I{X i < c}. Analogously, to estimate f + (c), they generated the regressand as
where n 1 = n i=1 1I{X i > c}. An advantage of their approach is that they do not need the tuning parameter bin size b as McCrary (2008) did. In the second step, they implemented 40 When the polynomial with the pth order is used, the kernel function accordingly should have bounded derivatives up to order p. 41 See equation (3.5) in Jones (1993) for the formula of the boundary kernel.
a local polynomial regression with order p for observations on each side of the potentialθ = f + (c) − f − (c). Otsu, Xu, and Matsushita (2013) also compared the finite sample performance of their empirical likelihood estimator based on the local linear fitting of the binned data and that based on the local linear likelihood approach. They recommended the latter, as it exhibited smaller bias as an estimator and larger power as a test. Naturally, the empirical likelihood approach circumvents estimation of the standard error. It also inherits some desirable properties, including the invariance to transformation of the parameter and automatic determination of the shape of confidence sets.
As we have seen, inference in density discontinuity is based primarily on density estimation at a known boundary. Apart from the local linear (polynomial) estimator, the statistical literature has proposed a variety of methods to reduce the boundary bias in density estimation. Some additional well-known approaches include the reflection method (Cline and Hart, 1991) , boundary kernel method (Müller, 1991; Jones, 1993; Zhang and Karunamuni, 1998) , transformation method (Wand, Marron, and Ruppert, 1991; Ruppert and Wand, 1994) , and their combinations.
43 The local linear (polynomial) smoothing approach has been popular because it is not only intuitive and easy to implement, but is also highly efficient. 
Conclusion
This paper discusses recent developments concerning the density discontinuity approach. We argue that the economic environment often presents substantial changes in outcomes associated with small-order changes in individual choices. In this case, the distribution of the outcome variable will present abnormal behavior around the threshold, which can be used to identify elasticities and behavioral responses. The typical setting in the density discontinuity approach involves (i) a continuity assumption on the latent distribution, similar to the assumption of the smooth conditional expectation of potential outcomes in the standard RDD setting; (ii) the absence of spillovers, which restricts the responses of individuals to just one side of the threshold; and (iii) an effect structure assumption, which describes the behavior of the individuals on the affected side of the threshold. Different forms of this assumption have been invoked in the literature to capture extensive-margin responses (Doyle, 2007; Jales, 2015) , intensive-margin responses (Bajari, Hong, Park, and Town, 2011) , and heterogeneity in bunching probabilities (Kleven and Waseem, 2013 ).
This survey is not exhaustive. In a parametric setting, Garicano, Lelarge, and Van Reenen (2013) explored the fact that companies in France face a substantial increase in labor costs 45 if they employ more than 50 individuals. They showed that in the absence of frictions and measurement error 46 , the density of observed employment will have a gap above 50 employees and bunching below this threshold. They used this fact to recover the underlying density of employment that would prevail in the absence of this policy and evaluate the effect of such employment rationing on the productivity distribution of French companies. Saez (2010) exploited the bunching at kink points of the tax system to estimate the elasticity of earnings with respect to taxes. Kopczuk and Munroe (2015) studied the effects of discontinuous housing transaction taxes on the price distribution and the size of the market in the case of New York and New Jersey mansion taxes. These papers exemplify how to nest the reduced-form approach from a density discontinuity setting with a fully specified structural model. By doing so, one obtains parameters that can be linked directly to policy-invariant, economically interpretable behavioral responses.
We believe that the density discontinuity approach can be a valuable tool in the applied econometrician's toolbox, allowing for identification and estimation of economic parameters in problems plagued by endogeneity of choices and lack of variation in the treatment across individuals.
However, in contrast to the RDD, where continuity of the conditional mean functions of potential outcomes and lack of sorting are sufficient for identification, the density discontinuity approach forces the researcher to impose additional restrictions. These restrictions are codified in assumptions concerning the limits of spillovers and the effect structure. In this survey, we demonstrated how different problems will require different effect structure assumptions. We also showed that these distinct economic problems share the common feature of abnormal behavior in the density at the threshold and how that can be used for identification.
The economic structure imposed in the density discontinuity approach is usually application specific, and its plausibility has to be judged on a case-by-case basis. For example, the stable unit treatment value assumption implicitly assumed in Kleven and Waseem's model of earnings implies an absence of spillovers of the tax effects.
47 The same assumption is certainly more controversial in minimum wage settings. Interestingly, the need to 45 For example, legislation requires a firm with 50 employees or more to establish a worker's council and a safety committee. See Garicano, Lelarge, and Van Reenen (2013) for details. 46 Given the presence of measurement error in employment levels in the data, the observed density is humpshaped around the threshold. Garicano, Lelarge, and Van Reenen (2013) specified a normal distribution for the measurement error and then relied on maximum likelihood for the parameter estimation. 47 The absence of spillovers is implied by the fact that an individual's potential earnings are solely a function of his idiosyncratic skill level and thus invariant to policy changes.
impose additional economic structure to achieve identification narrows the gap between the reduced-form approach of RDDs, where the goal is to simply identify the local effects of the policy, and the traditional structural approach, where the goal is to identify parameters that characterize, ceteris paribus, policy-invariant behavioral responses. To conclude, when discussing sorting and manipulation in the context of RDD, Lee and Lemieux (2010) wrote: so far we have discussed the sorting or manipulation issue as a potential problem or nuisance to the general program evaluation problem. But there is another way of viewing this sorting issue. (...) That is, economic behavior may be what is driving discontinuities in the frequency distribution (...) and those behavioral responses may be of interest. These cases (...) do not fit into the standard RD framework, but nevertheless can tell us something important about behavior, and further expand the kinds of questions that can be addressed by exploiting discontinuous rules to identify meaningful economic parameters of interest." As we have shown in this review, this branch of the literature has developed considerably in recent years, and the use of discontinuities in densities to identify structural and reduced-form parameters related to sorting have become increasingly common in applied work.
